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Abstract
The analysis of equilibrium points in random games has been of great interest in evolution-
ary game theory, with important implications for understanding of complexity in a dynamical
system, such as its behavioural, cultural or biological diversity. The analysis so far has focused
on random games of independent payoff entries. In this paper, we overcome this restrictive
assumption by considering multi-player two-strategy evolutionary games where the payoff ma-
trix entries are correlated random variables. Using techniques from the random polynomial
theory we establish a closed formula for the mean numbers of internal (stable) equilibria.
We then characterise the asymptotic behaviour of this important quantity for large group
sizes and study the effect of the correlation. Our results show that decreasing the correlation
among payoffs (namely, of a strategist for different group compositions) leads to larger mean
numbers of (stable) equilibrium points, suggesting that the system or population behavioural
diversity can be promoted by increasing independence of the payoff entries. Numerical results
are provided to support the obtained analytical results.
1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT) was originally introduced in 1973 by Maynard Smith
and Price [MSP73] as an application of classical game theory to biological contexts, providing
explanations for odd animal behaviours in conflict situations. Since then it has become one
of the most diverse and far reaching theories in biology, finding further applications in various
fields such as ecology, physics, economics and computer science [MS82, Axe84, HS98, Now06,
BR13, PS10, San10, HPL17]. For example, in economics, it has been used to make predictions
in settings where traditional assumptions about agents’ rationality and knowledge may not be
justified [Fri98, San10]. In computer science, EGT has been used extensively to model dynamics
and emergent behaviour in multiagent systems [TP07, Han13]. Furthermore, EGT has helped
explain the evolution and emergence of cooperative behaviours in diverse societies, one of the most
actively studied and challenging interdisciplinary problems in science [Pen05, HS98, Now06, BR16].
Similar to the foundational concept of Nash equilibrium in classical game theory [Nas50], the
study of equilibrium points and their stability in EGT has been of significant importance and
extensive research [BCV97, Bro03, GT10, HTG12, GT14, DH15, DH16, BR16]. They represent
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2population compositions where all the strategies have the same average fitness, thus predicting the
co-existence of different strategic behaviours or types in a population. The major body of such
EGT literature has focused on equilibrium properties in EGT for concrete games (i.e. games with
well-specified payoff structures) such as the coordination and the public goods games. For example,
the maximal number of equilibria, the stability and attainability of certain equilibrium points, in
concrete games have been well establish; see for example [BCV97, Bro00, PSSS09, SPS09, SCP15].
In contrast to the equilibrium analysis of concrete games, a recent body of works investigates
random games where individual payoffs obtained from the games are randomly assigned [GT10,
HTG12, GF13, GT14, DH15, DH16, BR16]. This analysis has proven useful to provide answers
to generic questions about a dynamical system such as its overall complexity. Using random
games is useful to model and understand social and biological systems in which very limited
information is available, or where the environment changes so rapidly and frequently that one
cannot predict the payoffs of their inhabitants [May01, FH92, HTG12, GRLD09]. Moreover, even
when randomly generated games are not directly representative for real world scenarios, they are
valuable as a null hypothesis that can be used to sharpen our understanding of what makes real
games special [GF13]. In general, an important question posed in these works is that of what is
the expected number, E(d), of internal equilibria in a d-player game? An answer to the
question provides important insights for the understanding of the expected levels of behavioural
diversity or biodiversity one can expect in a dynamical system [Lev00b, SSP08, GT10]. It would
allow us to predict the level of biodiversity in multiplayer interactions, describing the probability
of which a certain state of biodiversity may occur. Moreover, computing E(d) provides useful
upper-bounds for the probability pm that a certain number m of equilibria, is attainted, since
[HTG12]: pm ≤ E(d)/m. Of particular interest is such an estimate for the probability of attaining
the maximal of internal equilibria, i.e. pd−1, as in the Feldman–Karlin conjecture [Alt10].
Mathematically, to find internal equilibria in a d-player game with two strategies A and B,
one needs to solve the following polynomial equation for y > 0 (see Equation (5) and its derivation
in Section 2),
P (y) :=
d−1∑
k=0
βk
(
d− 1
k
)
yk = 0, (1)
where βk = ak − bk, with ak and bk being random variables representing the payoff entries of
the game payoff matrix for A and B, respectively. Therefore, calculating E(d) amounts to the
computation of the expected number of positive zeros of the (random) polynomial P . As will
be shown in Section 2, the set of positive roots of P is the same as that of the so-called gain
function which is a Bernstein polynomial. Thus one can gain information about internal equilibria
of a multiplayer game via studying positive roots of Bernstein polynomials. For deterministic
multiplayer games, this has already been carried out in the literature [PLN14]. One of the main
goals of this paper is to extend this research to random multiplayer games via studying random
polynomials.
In [GT10, HTG12, GT14], the authors provide both numerical and analytical results for games
with a small number of players (d ≤ 4), focusing on the probability of attaining a maximal number
of equilibrium points. These works use a direct approach by solving Equation (1), expressing
the positivity of its zeros as domains of conditions for the coefficients and then integrating over
these domains to obtain the corresponding probabilities. However, in general, a polynomial of
degree five or higher is not analytically solvable [Abe24]. Therefore, the direct approach can
not be generalised to larger d. More recently, in [DH15, DH16] the authors introduce a novel
method using techniques from random polynomials to calculate E(d) with an arbitrary d, under
the assumption that the entries of the payoff matrix are independent normal random variables.
More precisely, they derive a computationally implementable formula for E(d) for arbitrary d and
prove the following monotonicity and asymptotic behaviour of E(d):
E(d)
d− 1 is decreasing and limd→∞
lnE(d)
ln(d− 1) =
1
2
. (2)
3However, the requirement that the entries of the payoff matrix are independent random variables
are rather restricted from both mathematical and biological points of view. In evolutionary game
theory, correlations may arise in various scenarios particularly when there are environmental ran-
domness and interaction uncertainty such as in games of cyclic dominance [SP16], coevolutionary
multigames [SP14] or when individual contributions are correlated to the surrounding contexts
(e.g. due to limited resource) [SPLP12], see also recent reviews [SMJ+14, DMPT18] for more ex-
amples. One might expect some strategies to have many similar properties and hence yield similar
results for a given response of the respective opponent [BE98]. Furthermore, in a multi-player
game (such as the public goods games and their generalisations), a strategy’s payoffs, which may
differ for different group compositions, can be expected to be correlated given a specific nature of
the strategy [Har68, HDMHS02, HMND06, SSP08, Pen˜12, HPL15]. Similarly, different strategies’
payoffs may be correlated given the same group composition. From a mathematical perspective,
the study of real zeros of random polynomials with correlated coefficients has attracted substantial
attention, see e.g. [Sam76, BRS86, FN05, FN10, FN11].
In this paper we remove the assumption on the dependence of the coefficients. We will study
the expected number of internal equilibria and its various properties for random evolutionary
games in which the entries of the payoff matrix are correlated random variables.
1.2 Summary of main results
We now summarise the main results of this paper. More detailed statements will be presented
in the sequel sections. We consider d-player two-strategy random games in which the coefficients
βk (k ∈ {0, . . . , d − 1}) can be correlated random variables, satisfying that corr(βi, βj) = r for
i 6= j and for some 0 ≤ r ≤ 1 (see Lemma 2.1 about this assumption).
The main result of the paper is the following theorem which provides a formula for the
expected number, E(r, d), of internal equilibria, characterises its asymptotic behaviour and studies
the effect of the correlation.
Theorem 1.1 (On the expected number of internal equilibria).
1) (Computational formula for E(r, d))
E(r, d) = 2
∫ 1
0
f(t; r, d) dt, (3)
where the density function f(t; r, d) is given explicitly in (8).
2) (Monotonicity of E(r, d) with respect to r) The function r 7→ E(r, d) decreases for any given d.
3) (Asymptotic behaviour of E(r, d) for large d) We perform formal asymptotic computations to
get
E(r, d)

∼
√
2d−1
2 ∼ O(d1/2) if r = 0,
∼ d1/4(1−r)1/2
2pi5/4r1/2
8Γ( 54 )
2
√
pi
∼ O(d1/4) if 0 < r < 1,
= 0 if r = 1.
(4)
We compare this asymptotic behaviour numerically with the analytical formula obtained in part
1.
This theorem clearly shows that the correlation r has a significant effect on the expected
number of internal equilibria E(r, d). For sufficiently large d, when r increases from 0 (uncorre-
lated) to 1 (identical), E(r, d) reduces from O(d1/2) at r = 0, to O(d1/4) for 0 < r < 1 and to 0
at r = 1. This theorem generalises and improves the main results in [DH16] for the case r = 0:
the asymptotic behaviour, E(r, d) ∼
√
2d−1
2 , is stronger than (2). In addition, as a by-product of
our analysis, we provide an asymptotic formula for the expected number of real zeros of a random
Bernstein polynomial as conjectured in [EGT10], see Section 6.7.
41.3 Methodology of the present work
We develop further the connections between EGT and random/deterministic polynomials
theory discovered in [DH15, DH16]. The integral representation (3) is derived from the theory
of [EK95], which provides a general formula for the expected number of real zeros of a random
polynomial in a given domain, and the symmetry of the game, see Theorem 3.2; the monotonicity
and asymptotic behaviour of E(r, d) are obtained by using connections to Legendre polynomials,
which were described in [DH16], see Theorems 3.4 and 4.1.
1.4 Organisation of the paper
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we recall the replicator dynamics
for multi-player two-strategy games. In Section 3, we prove and numerically validate the first and
the second parts of Theorem 1.1. Section 4 is devoted to the proof of the last part of Theorem
1.1 and its numerical verification. Section 5 provides further discussion and finally, Appendix 6
contains detailed computations and proofs of technical results.
2 Replicator dynamics
A fundamental model of evolutionary game theory is the replicator dynamics [TJ78, Zee80,
HS98, SS83, Now06], describing that whenever a strategy has a fitness larger than the average
fitness of the population, it is expected to spread. From the replicator dynamics one then can
derive a polynomial equation that an internal equilibria of a multiplayer game satisfies . To this
end, we consider an infinitely large population with two strategies, A and B. Let x, 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, be
the frequency of strategy A. The frequency of strategy B is thus (1 − x). The interaction of the
individuals in the population is in randomly selected groups of d participants, that is, they play
and obtain their fitness from d-player games. The game is defined through a (d− 1)-dimensional
payoff matrix [GT10], as follows. Let ak (resp., bk) be the payoff of an A-strategist (resp., B) in a
group containing k A strategists (i.e. d − k B strategists). In this paper, we consider symmetric
games where the payoffs do not depend on the ordering of the players. Asymmetric games will be
studied in our forthcoming paper [DTH17b]. In the symmetric case, the average payoffs of A and
B are, respectively
piA =
d−1∑
k=0
ak
(
d− 1
k
)
xk(1− x)d−1−k and piB =
d−1∑
k=0
bk
(
d− 1
k
)
xk(1− x)d−1−k.
Internal equilibria are those points that satisfy the condition that the fitnesses of both strategies
are the same piA = piB , which gives rise to g(x) = 0 where g(x) is the so-called gain function given
by [BHC06, PLN14]
g(x) =
d−1∑
k=0
βk
(
d− 1
k
)
xk(1− x)d−1−k,
where βk = ak − bk. Note that this equation can also be derived from the definition of an evolu-
tionary stable strategy (ESS), see e.g., [BCV97]. As also discussed in that paper, the evolutionary
solution of the game (such as the set of ESSs or the set of stable rest points of the replicator
dynamics) involves not only finding the roots of the gain function g(x) but also determining the
behaviour of g(x) in the vicinity of such roots. We also refer the reader to [TJ78, Zee80] and
references therein for further discussion on relations between ESSs and game dynamics. Using
the transformation y = x1−x , with 0 < y < +∞, and dividing g(x) by (1 − x)d−1 we obtain the
following polynomial equation for y
P (y) :=
d−1∑
k=0
βk
(
d− 1
k
)
yk = 0. (5)
5As in [GT10, DH15, DH16], we are interested in random games where ak and bk (thus βk), for
0 ≤ k ≤ d− 1, are random variables. However, in contrast to these papers where βk are assumed
to be independent, we analyse here a more general case where they are correlated. In particular,
we consider that any pair βi and βj , with 0 ≤ i 6= j ≤ d− 1, have a correlation r (0 ≤ r ≤ 1). In
general, r = 0 means βi and βj are independent while when r = 1 they have a (perfectly) linear
correlation, and the larger r is the stronger they are correlated. It is noteworthy that this type
of dependency between the coefficients is common in the literature on evolutionary game theory
[BE98, GF13] as well as random polynomial theory [Sam76, BRS86, FN11].
The next lemma shows how this assumption arises naturally from simple assumptions on the
game payoff entries. To state the lemma, let cov(X,Y ) and corr(X,Y ) denote the covariance
and correlation between random variables X and Y , respectively; moreover, var(X) = cov(X,X)
denotes the variance of X.
Lemma 2.1. Suppose that, for 0 ≤ i 6= j ≤ d− 1,
• var(ai) = var(bi) = η2,
• corr(ai, aj) = ra, corr(bi, bj) = rb,
• corr(ai, bj) = rab, corr(ai, bi) = r′ab.
Then, the correlation between βi and βj, for 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ d− 1, is given by
corr(βi, βj) =
ra + rb − 2rab
2(1− r′ab)
, (6)
which is a constant. Clearly, it increases with ra, rb and r
′
ab while decreasing with rab. Moreover,
if ra + rb = 2rab then βi and βj are independent. Also, if rab = r
′
ab = 0, i.e. when payoffs from
different strategists are independent, we have: corr(βi, βj) =
ra+rb
2 . If we further assume that
ra = rb = r, then corr(βi, βj) = r.
Proof. See Appendix 6.1.
The assumptions in Lemma 2.1 mean that a strategist’s payoffs for different group composi-
tions have a constant correlation, which in general is different from the cross-correlation of payoffs
for different strategists. These assumptions arise naturally for example in a multi-player game
(such as the public goods games and their generalisations), since a strategist’s payoffs, which may
differ for different group compositions, can be expected to be correlated given a specific nature of
the strategy (e.g. cooperative vs. defective strategies in the public goods games). These natural
assumptions regarding payoffs’ correlations are just to ensure the pairs βi and βj , 0 ≤ i 6= j ≤ d−1,
have a constant correlation. Characterising the general case where βi and βj have varying corre-
lations would be mathematically interesting but is out of the scope of this paper. We will discuss
further this issue particularly for other types of correlations in Section 5.
3 The expected number of internal equilibria E(r, d)
We consider the case where βk are standard normal random variables but assume that all the
pairs βi and βj , for 0 ≤ i 6= j ≤ d− 1, have the same correlation 0 ≤ r ≤ 1 (cf. Lemma 2.1).
In this section, we study the expected number of internal equilibria E(r, d). The starting point
of the analysis of this section is an improper integral to compute E(r, d) as a direct application
of the Edelman-Kostlan theorem [EK95], see Lemma 3.1. We then further simplify this formula
to obtain a more computationally tractable one (see Theorem 3.2) and then prove a monotone
property of E(r, d) as a function of the correlation r, see Theorem 3.4.
63.1 Computations of E(r, d)
Lemma 3.1. Assume that βk are standard normal random variables and that for any i 6= j, the
correlation between βi and βj is equal to r for some 0 ≤ r ≤ 1. Then the expected number of
internal equilibria, E(r, d), in a d-player random game with two strategies is given by
E(r, d) =
∫ ∞
0
f(t; r, d) dt, (7)
where
[pi f(t; r, d)]2 =
(1− r)
d−1∑
i=0
i2
(
d− 1
i
)2
t2(i−1) + r(d− 1)2(1 + t)2(d−2)
(1− r)
d−1∑
i=0
(
d− 1
i
)2
t2i + r(1 + t)2(d−1)
−

(1− r)
d−1∑
i=0
i
(
d− 1
i
)2
t2i−1 + r(d− 1)(1 + t)2d−3
(1− r)
d−1∑
i=0
(
d− 1
i
)2
t2i + r(1 + t)2(d−1)

2
. (8)
Proof. According to [EK95] (see also [DH15, DH16]), we have
E(r, d) =
∫ ∞
0
f(t; r, d) dt,
where the density function f(t; r, d) is determined by
f(t; r, d) =
1
pi
[
∂2
∂x∂y
(
log v(x)TCv(y)
)∣∣∣
y=x=t
] 1
2
, (9)
with the covariance matrix C and the vector v are given by
Cij =

(
d− 1
i
)2
, if i = j
r
(
d− 1
i
)(
d− 1
j
)
, if i 6= j.
and v(x) =

1
x
...
xd−1
 . (10)
Let us define
H(x, y) := v(x)TCv(y)
=
d−1∑
i=0
(
d− 1
i
)2
xiyi + r
d−1∑
i 6=j=0
(
d− 1
i
)(
d− 1
j
)
xiyj
= (1− r)
d−1∑
i=0
(
d− 1
i
)2
xiyi + r
(
d−1∑
i=0
(
d− 1
i
)
xi
)d−1∑
j=0
(
d− 1
j
)
yj
 . (11)
Then we compute
∂2
∂x∂y
(log v(x)TCv(y)) = ∂
2
∂x∂y
logH(x, y) =
∂2xyH(x, y)
H(x, y)
− ∂xH(x, y)∂yH(x, y)
H(x, y)2
.
7Particularly, for y = x = t, we obtain
∂2
∂x∂y
(log v(x)TCv(y))
∣∣∣
y=x=t
=
(
∂2xyH(x, y)
H(x, y)
− ∂xH(x, y)∂yH(x, y)
H(x, y)2
)∣∣∣
y=x=t
=
∂2xyH(x, y)
∣∣
y=x=t
H(t, t)
−
(
∂xH(x, y)
∣∣
y=x=t
H(t, t)
)2
.
Using (11) we can compute each term on the right hand side of the above expression explicitly
H(t, t) = (1− r)
d−1∑
i=0
(
d− 1
i
)2
t2i + r
(
d−1∑
i=0
(
d− 1
i
)
ti
)2
, (12a)
∂xH(x, y)
∣∣
y=x=t
= (1− r)
d−1∑
i=0
i
(
d− 1
i
)2
t2i−1 + r
(
d−1∑
i=0
i
(
d− 1
i
)
ti
)d−1∑
j=0
(
d− 1
j
)
tj−1
 ,
(12b)
∂2xyH(x, y)
∣∣
y=x=t
= (1− r)
d−1∑
i=0
i2
(
d− 1
i
)2
t2(i−1) + r
(
d−1∑
i=0
i
(
d− 1
i
)
ti−1
)2
. (12c)
We can simplify further the above expressions using the following computations which are attained
from the binomial theorem and its derivatives(
d−1∑
i=0
(
d− 1
i
)
ti
)2
= (1 + t)2(d−1), (13a)
(
d−1∑
i=0
i
(
d− 1
i
)
ti−1
)2
=
(
d
dt
d−1∑
i=0
(
d− 1
i
)
ti
)2
=
(
d
dt
(1 + t)d−1
)2
= (d− 1)2(1 + t)2(d−2),
(13b)(
d−1∑
i=0
i
(
d− 1
i
)
ti
)d−1∑
j=0
(
d− 1
j
)
tj−1
 = 1
2
d
dt
(
d−1∑
i=0
(
d− 1
i
)
ti
)2
=
1
2
d
dt
(1 + t)2(d−1)
= (d− 1)(1 + t)2d−3. (13c)
Substituting (12) and (13) back into (9), we obtain (8) and complete the proof.
Next we will show that, as in the case r = 0 studied in [DH15, DH16], the improper integral
(7) can be reduced to a definite integral from 0 to 1. A crucial property enables us to do so is the
symmetry of the strategies. The main result of this section is the following theorem (cf. Theorem
1.1–(1)).
Theorem 3.2. (1) The density function f(t; r, d) satisfies that
f(1/t; r, d) = t2f(t; r, d). (14)
(2) (Computable formula for E(r, d)). E(r, d) can be computed via
E(r, d) = 2
∫ 1
0
f(t)dt = 2
∫ ∞
1
f(t) dt. (15)
Proof. The proof of the first part is lengthy and is given in Appendix 6.2. Now we prove the
second part. We have
E(r, d) =
∫ ∞
0
f(t; r, d) dt =
∫ 1
0
f(t; r, d) dt+
∫ ∞
1
f(t; r, d) dt. (16)
8By changing of variables t := 1s , the first integral on the right-hand side of (16) can be transformed
as ∫ 1
0
f(t; r, d) dt =
∫ ∞
1
f(1/s; r, d)
1
s2
ds =
∫ ∞
1
f(s; r, d) ds, (17)
where we have used (14) to obtain the last equality. The assertion (15) is then followed from (16)
and (17).
As in [DH16], we can interpret the first part of Theorem 3.2 as a symmetric property of the
game. We recall that t = y1−y , where y and 1− y are respectively the fractions of strategy 1 and
2. We write the density function f(t; r, d) in terms of y using the change of variable formula as
follows.
f(t; r, d) dt = f
( y
1− y ; r, d
) 1
(1− y)2 dy := g(y; r, d) dy,
where
g(y; r, d) := f
( y
1− y ; r, d
) 1
(1− y)2 . (18)
The following lemma expresses the symmetry of the strategies (swapping the index labels converts
an equilibrium at y to one at 1− y).
Corollary 3.3. The function y 7→ g(y; r, d) is symmetric about the line y = 12 , i.e.,
g(y; r, d) = g(1− y; r, d). (19)
Proof. The equality (19) is a direct consequence of (14). We have
g(1− y; r, d) = f
(1− y
y
; r, d
) 1
y2
(14)
= f
( y
1− y ; r, d
) y2
(1− y)2
1
y2
= f
( y
1− y ; r, d
) 1
(1− y)2 = g(y; r, d).
3.2 Monotonicity of r 7→ E(r, d)
In this section we study the monotone property of E(r, d) as a function of the correlation r.
The main result of this section is the following theorem on the monotonicity of r 7→ E(r, d) (cf.
Theorem 1.1–(2)).
Theorem 3.4. The function r 7→ f(t; r, d) is decreasing. As a consequence, r 7→ E(r, d) is also
decreasing.
Proof. We define the following notations:
M1 = M1(t; r, d) =
d−1∑
i=0
(
d− 1
i
)2
t2i, M2 = M2(t; r, d) = (1 + t)
2(d−1),
A1 = A1(t; r, d) =
d−1∑
i=0
i2
(
d− 1
i
)2
t2(i−1), A2 = A2(t; r, d) = (d− 1)2(1 + t)2(d−2),
B1 = B1(t; r, d) =
d−1∑
i=0
i
(
d− 1
i
)2
t2i−1, B2 = B2(t; r, d) = (d− 1)(1 + t)2d−3,
M = (1− r)M1 + rM2, A = (1− r)A1 + rA2, B = (1− r)B1 + rB2.
Then the density function f(t; r, d) in (8) can be written as
(pif(t; r, d))2 =
AM −B2
M2
. (20)
9Taking the derivation with respect to r of the right hand side of (20) we obtain
∂
∂r
(
AM −B2
M2
)
=
(A′M +M ′A− 2BB′)M2 − 2(AM − 2B2)MM ′
M4
=
(A′M +M ′A− 2BB′)M − 2(AM −B2)M ′
M3
=
2B(BM ′ −B′M)−M(AM ′ −MA′)
M3
(∗)
=
2B(B1M2 −M1B2)−M(A1M2 −M1A2)
M3
=
2B
(
B1(1 + t)
2(d−1) −M1(d− 1)(1 + t)2d−3
)−M (A1(1 + t)2(d−1) −M1(d− 1)2(1 + t)2(d−2))
M3
=
(1 + t)2d−4
{
2(t+ 1)B [B1(1 + t)−M1(d− 1)]−M
[
A1(1 + t)
2 −M1(d− 1)2
]}
M3
.
Note that to obtain (*) above we have used the following simplifications
BM ′ −B′M = [B1 + r(B2 −B1)] (M2 −M1)− (B2 −B1) [M1 + r(M2 −M1)]
= B1(M2 −M1)− (B2 −B1)M1
= B1M2 −M1B2,
and similarly,
AM ′ −A′M = A1M2 −M1A2.
Since M > 0 and according to Proposition 6.1,
2(t+ 1)B
[
B1(1 + t)−M1(d− 1)
]
−M
[
A1(1 + t)
2 −M1(d− 1)2
]
≤ 0,
it follows that
∂
∂r
(
AM −B2
M2
)
≤ 0.
The assertion of the theorem is then followed from this and (20).
As a consequence, we can derive the monotonicity property of the number of stable equilibrium
points, denoted by SE(r, d). It is based on the following property of stable equilibria in multi-
player two-strategy evolutionary games, which has been proved in [HTG12, Theorem 3] for payoff
matrices with independent entries. We provide a similar proof below for matrices with exchangeable
payoff entries. We need the following auxiliary lemma whose proof is presented in Appendix 6.3.
Lemma 3.5. Let X and Y be two exchangeable random variables, i.e. their joint probability
distribution fX,Y (x, y) is symmetric, fX,Y (x, y) = fX,Y (y, x). Then Z = X − Y is symmetrically
distributed about 0, i.e., its probability distribution satisfies fZ(z) = fZ(−z). In addition, if X
and Y are iid then they are exchangeable.
Theorem 3.6. Suppose that ak and βk are exchangeable random variables. For d-player evolu-
tionary games with two strategies, the following holds
SE(r, d) =
1
2
E(r, d). (21)
Proof. The replicator equation in this game is given by [HMND06, GT10]
x˙ = x(1− x)
d−1∑
k=0
βk
(
d−1
k
)
xk(1− x)d−1−k. (22)
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Suppose x∗ ∈ (0, 1) is an internal equilibrium of the system and h(x) be the polynomial on the
right hand side of the equation. Since x∗ is stable if and only if h′(x∗) < 0 which can be simplified
to [HTG12]
d−1∑
k=1
kβk
(
d−1
k
)
y∗k−1 < 0, (23)
where y∗ = x
∗
1−x∗ . As a system admits the same set of equilibria if we change the sign of all βk
simultaneously, and for such a change the above inequality would change the direction (thus the
stable equilibrium x∗ would become unstable), all we need to show for the theorem to hold is that
βk has a symmetric density function. This is guaranteed by Lemma 3.5 since βk = ak − bk where
ak and bk are exchangeable.
Corollary 3.7. Under the assumption of Theorem 3.6, the expected number of stable equilibrium
points SE(r,d) is a decreasing function with respect to r.
Proof. This is a direct consequence of Theorems 3.4 and 3.6.
3.3 Monotonicity of E(r, d): numerical investigation
In this section, we numerically validate the analytical results obtained in the previous section.
In Figure 1, we plot the functions r 7→ E(r, d) for several values of d (left panel) and d 7→ E(r, d) for
different values of r using formula 7 (right panel). In the panel on the left we also show the value
of E(r, d) obtained from samplings. That is, we generate 106 samples of βk(0 ≤ k ≤ d− 1) where
βk are normally distributed random variables satisfying that corr(βi, βj) = r for 0 ≤ i 6= j ≤ d−1.
For each sample we solve Equation (5) to obtain the corresponding number internal equilibria (i.e.
the number of positive zeros of the polynomial equation). By averaging over all the 106 samples
we obtain the probability of observing m internal equilibria, p¯m, for each 0 ≤ m ≤ d− 1. Finally
the mean or expected number of internal equilibria is calculated as E(r, d) =
∑d−1
m=0m · p¯m. The
figure shows the agreement of results obtained from analytical and sampling methods. In addition,
it also demonstrates the decreasing property of r 7→ E(r, d), which was proved in Theorem 3.4.
Additionally, we observe that E(r, d) increases with the group size, d.
Note that to generate correlated normal random variables, we use the following algorithm
that can be found in many textbooks, for instance [NC00, Section 4.1.8].
Algorithm 3.8. Generate n correlated Gaussian distributed random variables Y = (Y1, . . . , Yn),
Y ∼ N (µ,Σ), given the mean vector µ and the covariance matrix Σ.
Step 1. Generate a vector of uncorrelated Gaussian random variables, Z,
Step 2. Define Y = µ+ CZ where C is the square root of Σ (i.e., CCT = Σ).
The square root of a matrix can be found using the Cholesky decomposition. These two steps
are easily implemented in Mathematica.
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Figure 1: (Left) Plot of r 7→ E(r, d) for different values of d. The solid lines are generated
from analytical (A) formulas of E(r, d) as defined in Equation (7). The solid diamonds capture
simulation (S) results obtained by averaging over 106 samples of βk (1 ≤ k ≤ d− 1), where these
βk are correlated, normally standard random variables. To generate correlated random variables,
the algorithm described in Algorithm 3.8 was used. (Right) Plot of d 7→ E(r, d) for different
values of r. We observe that E(r, d) decreases with respect to r but increases with respect to d.
4 Asymptotic behaviour of E(r, d)
4.1 Asymptotic behaviour of E(r, d): formal analytical computations
In this section we perform formal asymptotic analysis to understand the behaviour of E(r, d)
when d becomes large.
Proposition 4.1. We have the following asymptotic behaviour of E(r, d) as d→∞
E(r, d)

∼
√
2d−1
2 if r = 0,
∼ d1/4(1−r)1/2
2pi5/4r1/2
8Γ( 54 )
2
√
pi
if 0 < r < 1,
= 0 if r = 1.
Proof. We consider the case r = 1 first. In this case, we have
M(t) = M2(t) = (1+t)
2(d−1), A(t) = A2(t) = (d−1)2(1+t)2(d−2), B(t) = B2(t) = (d−1)(1+t)2d−3.
Since A2(t)M2(t)−B22(t) = 0, we obtain f(t; 1, d) = 0. Therefore E(1, d) = 0.
We now deal with the case 0 ≤ r < 1. According to [BO99, Example 2, page 229], [WW12],
for any x > 1
Pd(x) =
1√
2dpi
(x+
√
x2 − 1)d+1/2
(x2 − 1)1/4 +O(d
−1) as d→∞.
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Therefore,
M1 = (1− t2)d−1Pd−1
(
1 + t2
1− t2
)
∼ 1√
4pi(d− 1)t (1 + t)
2d−1 and
M ∼ (1− r) 1√
4pi(d− 1)t (1 + t)
2d−1 + r(1 + t)2d−2.
Using the relations between A1, B1 and M1 in (27), we obtain
A ∼ (d− 1)2r(t+ 1)2(d−2) + (2d− 1)(t+ 1)
2d−2
8t
√
pi
√
(d− 1)t −
(d− 1)(t+ 1)2d−1
16t
√
pi((d− 1)t)3/2
+
1
4
(
(2d− 2)(2d− 1)(t+ 1)2d−3
2
√
pi
√
(d− 1)t −
(d− 1)(2d− 1)(t+ 1)2d−2
2
√
pi((d− 1)t)3/2 +
3(d− 1)2(t+ 1)2d−1
8
√
pi((d− 1)t)5/2
)
B ∼ (d− 1)r(t+ 1)2d−3 + 1
2
(1− r)
(
(2d− 1)(t+ 1)2d−2
2
√
pi
√
(d− 1)t −
(d− 1)(t+ 1)2d−1
4
√
pi((d− 1)t)3/2
)
.
Therefore, we get
f2 =
1
pi2
AM −B2
M2
∼
(1− r)
(
2(1− 2d)(r − 1)t(t+ 1) +√pir(t(8d+ t− 6) + 1)√(d− 1)t)
8pi2t2(t+ 1)
(
(r − 1)(t+ 1)− 2√pir√(d− 1)t)2 .
Denote the expression on the right-hand side by f2a . If r = 0, we have
f2a =
2(2d− 1)t(t+ 1)
8pi2t2(t+ 1)(t+ 1)2
=
2d− 1
4pi2t(t+ 1)2
,
which means
fa =
√
2d− 1
2pi
√
t(t+ 1)
.
Therefore
E ∼ Ea := 2
∫ 1
0
fa dt = 2
∫ 1
0
√
2d− 1
2pit1/2(1 + t)
dt =
√
2d− 1
2
= O(d1/2).
It remains to consider the case 0 < r < 1. As the first asymptotic value of E we compute
E1 = 2
∫ 1
0
fa(t) dt. (24)
However, this formula is still not explicit since we need to take square-root of fa. Next we will offer
another explicit approximation. To this end, we will further simplify fa asymptotically. Because(
2(1− 2d)(r − 1)t(t+ 1) +√pir(t(8d+ t− 6) + 1)
√
(d− 1)t
)
∼ √pirt8d
√
dt
and (
(r − 1)(t+ 1)− 2√pir
√
(d− 1)t
)2
∼ 4pir2dt
we obtain
f2a =
(1− r)
(
2(1− 2d)(r − 1)t(t+ 1) +√pir(t(8d+ t− 6) + 1)√(d− 1)t)
8pi2t2(t+ 1)
(
(r − 1)(t+ 1)− 2√pir√(d− 1)t)2
∼ (1− r)
√
pirt8d
√
dt
8pi2t2(t+ 1)4pir2dt
=
√
d(1− r)
4pi5/2rt3/2(t+ 1)
,
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which implies that
fa ∼ d
1/4(1− r)1/2
2pi5/4r1/2t3/4(t+ 1)1/2
.
Hence, we obtain another approximation for E(r, d) as follows.
E(r, d) ∼ E2 :=
∫ 1
0
d1/4(1− r)1/2
2pi5/4r1/2t3/4(t+ 1)1/2
dt
=
d1/4(1− r)1/2
2pi5/4r1/2
∫ 1
0
1
t3/4(t+ 1)1/2
dt
=
d1/4(1− r)1/2
2pi5/4r1/2
8Γ
(
5
4
)2
√
pi
. (25)
The formal computations clearly shows that the correlation r between the coefficients {β}
significantly influences the expected number of equilibria E(r, d):
E(r, d) =

O(d1/2), if r = 0,
O(d1/4), if 0 < r < 1,
0, if r = 1.
In Section 4.2 we will provide numerical verification for our formal computations.
Corollary 4.2. The expected number of stable equilibrium points SE(r,d) follows the asymptotic
behaviour
SE(r, d) =

O(d1/2), if r = 0,
O(d1/4), if 0 < r < 1,
0, if r = 1.
Proof. This is a direct consequence of Theorems 3.4 and 4.1.
Remark 4.3. In Appendix 6.4, we show the following asymptotic formula for f(1; r, d)
f(1; r, d) ∼ (d− 1)
1/4(1− r)1/2
2
√
2pi5/4r1/2
.
It is worth noticing that this asymptotic behaviour is of the same form as that of E(r, d).
4.2 Asymptotic behaviour of E(r, d): numerical investigation
In this section, we numerically validate the asymptotic behaviour of E(r, d) for large d that is
obtained in the previous section using formal analytical computations. In Figure 2, Table 1 and
Table 2 we plot the ratios of the asymptotically approximations of E(r, d) obtained in Section 4
with itself, i.e, E1/E(r, d) and E2/E(r, d), for different values of r and d. We observe that: for
r = 0 the approximation is good; while for 0 < r < 1: E1 (respectively, E2) approximates E(r, d)
better when r is small (respectively, when r is close to 1).
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Figure 2: Plot of E1/E(r, d) (left), and E2/E(r, d) (right). The figure shows that these ratios
all converge to 1 when d becomes large. We also notice that E2 approximates E better when r is
close to 1 while E1 approximates E better when r is small.
HHHHHd
r
0 0.01 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.8
20 0.119 0.126 0.178 0.305 0.484 1.106
40 0.08 0.086 0.128 0.23 0.373 0.871
120 0.045 0.049 0.08 0.154 0.257 0.616
200 0.034 0.038 0.065 0.129 0.219 0.529
320 0.027 0.03 0.055 0.111 0.19 0.461
440 0.023 0.026 0.049 0.1 0.172 0.421
600 0.019 0.023 0.044 0.091 0.157 0.385
Table 1:
∣∣∣E1E − 1∣∣∣
HHHHHd
r
0 0.01 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.8
20 0.119 5.855 1.495 0.745 0.528 0.374
40 0.08 4.587 1.148 0.575 0.409 0.29
120 0.045 3.186 0.782 0.397 0.285 0.203
200 0.034 2.701 0.661 0.338 0.244 0.174
320 0.027 2.322 0.568 0.293 0.212 0.152
440 0.023 2.097 0.514 0.266 0.193 0.138
600 0.019 1.9 0.467 0.243 0.176 0.127
Table 2:
∣∣∣E2E − 1∣∣∣
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied the mean value, E (r , d), of the number of internal equilibria
in d-player two-strategy random evolutionary games where the entries of the payoff matrix are
correlated random variables (r is the correlation). We have provided analytical formulas for
E (r , d) and proved that it is decreasing as a function of r. That is, our analysis has shown
that decreasing the correlation among payoff entries leads to larger expected numbers of (stable)
equilibrium points. This suggests that when payoffs obtained by a strategy for different group
compositions are less correlated, it would lead to higher levels of strategic or behavioural diversity
in a population. Thus, one might expect that when strategies behave conditionally on or even
randomly for different group compositions, diversity would be promoted. Furthermore, we have
shown that the asymptotic behaviour of E (r , d) (and thus also of the mean number of stable
equilibrium points, SE (r , d)), i.e. when the group size d is sufficiently large, is highly sensitive
to the correlation value r. Namely, E (r , d) (and SE (r , d)) asymptotically behave in the order
of d1/2 for r = 0 (i.e. the payoffs are independent for different group compositions), of d1/4 for
0 < r < 1 (i.e. non-extreme correlation), and 0 when r = 1 (i.e. the payoffs are perfectly linear).
It is also noteworthy that our numerical results showed that E (r , d) increases with the group
size d. In general, our findings might have important implications for the understanding of social
and biological systems given the important roles of social and biological diversities, e.g. in the
evolution of cooperative behaviour and population fitness distribution [Lev00a, SPLP12, Pen˜12].
Moreover, we have explored further connections between EGT and random polynomial theory
initiated in our previous works [DH15, DH16]. The random polynomial P obtained from EGT
(cf. (5)) differs from three well-known classes of random polynomials, namely Kac polynomials,
elliptic polynomials and Weyl polynomials, that are investigated intensively in the literature. We
elaborate further this difference in Section 6.6. In addition, as will be explained in Section 6.7,
the set of positive roots of P is the same as that of a Bernstein random polynomial. As a result,
our work provides an analytical formula and asymptotic behaviour for the expected number of
Bernstein random polynomials proving [EGT10, Conjecture 4.7]. Thus, our work also contributes
to the literature of random polynomial theory and to further its existing connection to EGT.
Although the expected number of internal equilibria provides macroscopic (average) infor-
mation, to gain deeper insights into a multiplayer game such as possibilities of different states
of biodiversity or the maintenance of biodiversity, it is crucial to analyse the probability distri-
bution of the number of (stable) internal equilibria [Lev00a, GT10, SPP16]. Thus a more subtle
questions is: what is the probability, pm, with 0 ≤ m ≤ d− 1, that a d-player two-strategy game
attains m internal equilibria? This question has been addressed for games with a small number
of players [GT10, HTG12]. We will tackle this more intricate question for arbitary d in a seperate
paper [DTH17a]. We expect that our work in this paper as well as in [DTH17a] will open up
a new exciting avenue of research in the study of equilibrium properties of random evolutionary
games. We discuss below some directions for future research.
Other types of correlations. In this paper we have assumed that the correlations corr(βi, βj)
are constants for all pairs i 6= j. This is a fairly simple relation. Generally corr(βi, βj) may
depend on i and j as showing in Lemma 2.1. Two interesting cases that are commonly studied
in interacting particle systems are: (a) exponentially decay correlations, corr(βi, βj) = ρ
|i−j| for
some 0 < ρ < 1, and (b) algebraically decay correlations, corr(βi, βj) = (1 + |i − j|)−α for some
α > 0. These types of correlations have been studied in the literature for different types of random
polynomials [Sam78, BRS86, FN10].
Universality phenomena. Recently in [TV15] the authors proved, for other classes of random
polynomials (such as Kac polynomials, Weyl polynomials and elliptic polynomials, see Section
6.6), an intriguing universal phenomena: the asymptotic behavior of the expected number of zeros
in the non-gaussian case match that of the gaussian case once one has performed appropriate
normalizations. Further research is demanded to see whether this universality phenomena holds
true for the random polynomial (1).
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6 Appendix: detailed proofs and computations
This appendix consists of detailed proofs and computations of some lemmas and theorems in
the main text.
6.1 Proof of Lemma 2.1
We have
cov(βi, βj) = cov(ai − bi, aj − bj)
= cov(ai, aj) + cov(bi, bj)− cov(ai, bj)− cov(bi, aj)
= raη
2 + rbη
2 − 2rabη2
= (ra + rb − 2rab)η2.
Similarly,
var(βi) = var(ai − bi) = cov(ai − bi, ai − bi) = 2η2 − 2r′abη2 = 2(1− r′ab)η2.
Hence, the correlation between βi and βj is
corr(βi, βj) =
cov(βi, βj)√
var(βi)var(βj)
=
(ra + rb − 2rab)η2
2(1− r′ab)η2
=
ra + rb − 2rab
2(1− r′ab)
.
6.2 Proof of Theorem 3.2–(1)
We prove (14). We recall the following notations that have been used in the proof of Theorem
3.4.
M1 = M1(t, d) =
d−1∑
i=0
(
d− 1
i
)2
t2i, M2 = M2(t, d) = (1 + t)
2(d−1),
A1 = A1(t, d) =
d−1∑
i=0
i2
(
d− 1
i
)2
t2(i−1), A2 = A2(t, d) = (d− 1)2(1 + t)2(d−2)
B1 = B1(t, d) =
d−1∑
i=0
i
(
d− 1
i
)2
t2i−1, B2 = B2(t, d) = (d− 1)(1 + t)2d−3,
M = M(t; r, d) = (1− r)M1 + rM2, A = A(t; r, d) = (1− r)A1 + rA2,
B = B(t; r, d) = (1− r)B1 + rB2.
Then the density function f(t; r, d) is expressed in terms of M,A and B as (for simplicity of
notation we drop r, d in f in the following)
f(t) =
1
pi
√
AM −B2
M
. (26)
Next we compute f(1/t). According to [DH16], we have the following relations, where ′ denotes a
derivative with respect to t,
A1(t) =
1
4t
(tM ′1(t))
′ =
1
4t
(M ′1(t) + tM
′′
1 (t)), B1(t) =
1
2
M ′1(t), M1(1/t) = t
2−2dM1(t) (27)
A1(1/t) =
t
4
[
M ′1(1/t) +
1
t
M ′′1 (1/t)
]
=
1
4
t4−2d
[
4(d− 1)2M1(t) + (5− 4d)tM ′1(t) + t2M ′′1 (t)
]
,
B1(1/t) =
1
2
M ′1(1/t) = −t3−2d
[
(1− d)M1(t) + 1
2
tM ′1(t)
]
.
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Using the relations between A1, B1 and M1 in (27), we transform further A1(1/t) and B1(1/t)
A1(1/t) =
1
4
t4−2d
[
4(d− 1)2M1(t) + 4(1− d)tM ′1(t) + t(M ′1(t) + tM ′′1 (t))
]
= t4−2d
[
4(d− 1)2M1(t) + 4(1− d)tM ′1(t) + t2A1(t)
]
,
B1(1/t) = −t3−2d
[
(1− d)M1(t) + 1
2
tM ′1(t)
]
= t2−2d
[
(d− 1)M1(t)− tB1(t)
]
.
Using explicit formulas of M2, A2 and B2, we get
M2(1/t) = t
2−2dM2(t), A2(1/t) = t4−2dA2(t), B2(1/t) = t3−2dB2(t). (28)
Therefore, we obtain
M(1/t) = (1− r)M1(1/t) + rM2(1/t) = t2−2d[(1− r)M1(t) + rM2(t)] = t2−2dM(t),
A(1/t) = t4−4d
[
(1− r)
(
(d− 1)2M1(t) + (1− d)tM ′1(t) + t2A1(t)
)
+ rA2(t)
]
,
B(1/t) = t3−2d
[
(1− r)
(
(d− 1)M1(t)− tB1(t)
)
+ rB2(t)
]
,
M(1/t)A(1/t) = t6−4d
[
(1− r)2
(
(d− 1)2M1(t) + (1− d)tM ′1(t) + t2A1(t)
)
M1(t)
+ r(1− r)
((
(d− 1)2M1(t) + (1− d)tM ′1(t) + t2A1(t)
)
M2(t) +A2(t)M1(t)
)
+ r2A2(t)M2(t)
]
,
B(1/t)2 = t6−4d
[
(1− r)2
(
(d− 1)M1(t)− tB1(t)
)2
+ 2r(1− r)
(
(d− 1)M1(t)− tB1(t)
)
B2(t) + r
2B2(t)
2
]
.
So we have
M(1/t)A(1/t)−B(1/t)2
= t6−4d
[
(1− r)2
(
(1− d)tM1(t)M ′1(t) + t2A1(t)M1(t) + 2(d− 1)M1(t)B1(t)− t2B1(t)2
)
+ r(1− r)
(
(d− 1)2M1(t)M2(t) + (1− d)tM ′1(t)M2(t) + t2A1(t)M2(t) +A2(t)M1(t)
− 2
(
(d− 1)M1(t)− tB1(t)
)
B2(t)
)
+ r2(A2(t)M2(t)−B2(t)2)
]
. (29)
Using the relations (27) and explicit formulas of A2, B2,M2 we get
A2(t)M2(t)−B22(t) = 0,
(1− d)tM1(t)M ′1(t) + 2(d− 1)M1(t)B1(t) = (d− 1)M1(t)
[
2B1(t)−M ′1(t)
]
= 0,
(d− 1)2M1(t)M2(t) +A2(t)M1(t)− 2(d− 1)M1(t)B2(t)
= M1(t)
(
(d− 1)M2(t) +A2(t)− 2(d− 1)B2(t)
)
= t2M1(t)A2(t),
(1− d)tM ′1(t)M2(t) + 2tB1(t)B2(t) = 2(1− d)tB1(t)M2(t) + 2tB1(t)B2(t)
= B1(t)
(
2(1− d)tM2(t) + 2tB2(t)
)
= −2t2B1(t)B2(t).
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Substituting these computations into (29), we obtain
M(1/t)A(1/t)−B(1/t)2
= t8−4d
[
(1− r)2
(
A1(t)M1(t)−B1(t)2
)
+ r(1− r)
(
M1(t)A2(t) +M2(t)A1(t)− 2B1(t)B2(t)
)]
= t8−4d
[(
(1− r)M1(t) + rM2(t)
)(
(1− r)A1(t) + rA2(t)
)
−
(
(1− r)B1(t) + rB2(t)
)2]
= t8−4d
(
M(t)A(t)−B(t)2
)
.
Finally, we get
f(1/t) =
1
pi
√
A(1/t)M(1/t)−B(1/t)2
M(1/t)
=
1
pi
t4−2d
√
A(t)M(t)−B2(t)
t2−2dM(t)
=
1
pi
t2
√
A(t)M(t)−B2(t)
M(t)
= t2f(t).
6.3 Proof of Lemma 3.5
The probability distribution, fZ , of Z = X − Y can be found via the joint probability
distribution fX,Y as
fZ(z) =
∫ ∞
−∞
fX,Y (x, x− z) dx =
∫ ∞
−∞
fX,Y (y + z, y) dy.
Therefore, using the symmetry of fX,Y we get
fZ(−z) =
∫ ∞
−∞
fX,Y (x, x+ z) dx =
∫ ∞
−∞
fX,Y (x+ z, x) dx = fZ(z).
If X and Y are iid with the common probability distribution f then
fX,Y (x, y) = f(x)f(y),
which is symmetric with respect to x and y, i.e., X and Y are exchangeable.
6.4 Computations of f(1; r, d)
Substituting t = 1 into expressions of A,B,M at the beginning of the proof of Theorem 3.2,
we obtain
M(1; r, d) = (1− r)
d−1∑
k=0
(
d− 1
k
)2
+ r 22(d−1) = (1− r)
(
2(d− 1)
d− 1
)
+ r 22(d−1),
A(1; r, d) = (1− r)(d− 1)2M(1; r, d− 1) + r(d− 1)222(d−2) = (1− r)(d− 1)2
(
2(d− 2)
d− 2
)
+ r(d− 1)222(d−2),
B(1; r, d) = (1− r)
d−1∑
k=1
k
(
d− 1
k
)2
+ r(d− 1)22d−3) = (1− r)d− 1
2
(
2(d− 1)
d− 1
)
+ r(d− 1)22d−3.
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Therefore,
AM −B2 = (1− r)2(d− 1)2
(
2(d− 1)
d− 1
)[(
2(d− 2)
d− 2
)
− 1
4
(
2(d− 1)
d− 1
)]
+ r(1− r)(d− 1)222(d−2)
[
4
(
2(d− 2)
d− 2
)
+
(
2(d− 1)
d− 1
)
− 2
(
2(d− 1)
d− 1
)]
= (1− r)2(d− 1)2
(
2(d− 1)
d− 1
)[(
2(d− 2)
d− 2
)
− 1
4
(
2(d− 1)
d− 1
)]
+ r(1− r)(d− 1)222(d−1)
[(
2(d− 2)
d− 2
)
− 1
4
(
2(d− 1)
d− 1
)]
= (1− r)(d− 1)2
[(
2(d− 2)
d− 2
)
− 1
4
(
2(d− 1)
d− 1
)][
(1− r)
(
2(d− 1)
d− 1
)
+ r22d−1
]
.
Substituting this expression and that of M into (26), we get
f(1; r, d) =
1
pi
√
AM −B2
M
=
1
pi
(d− 1)√1− r ×
√√√√√√√
(
2(d− 2)
d− 2
)
− 14
(
2(d− 1)
d− 1
)
(1− r)
(
2(d− 1)
d− 1
)
+ r 22(d−1)
=
1
pi
(d− 1)√1− r ×
√√√√√√√
(
2(d− 1)
d− 1
)
1
4(2d−3)
(1− r)
(
2(d− 1)
d− 1
)
+ r 22(d−1)
=
1
pi
d− 1
2
√
2d− 3
√√√√√√√
(1− r)
(
2(d− 1)
d− 1
)
(1− r)
(
2(d− 1)
d− 1
)
+ r 22(d−1)
.
If r = 1 then f(1; r, d) = 0. If r < 1 then
f(1; r, d) =
1
pi
d− 1
2
√
2d− 3
√
1
1 + α
where α =
r
1− r
22(d−1)(
2(d− 1)
d− 1
) .
By Stirling formula, we have (
2n
n
)
∼ 4
n
√
pin
for large n.
It implies that for 0 < r < 1 and for large d
α ∼ r
1− r
√
pi(d− 1) and f(1; r, d) ∼ 1
pi
d− 1
2
√
2d− 3
√
1
1 + r1−r
√
pi(d− 1) ∼
(d− 1)1/4(1− r)1/2
2
√
2pi5/4r1/2
.
6.5 Some technical lemmas used in proof of Theorem 3.4
We need the following proposition.
Proposition 6.1. The following inequality holds
2(t+ 1)B
[
B1(1 + t)−M1(d− 1)
]
< M
[
A1(1 + t)
2 −M1(d− 1)2
]
. (30)
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To prove Proposition 6.1, we need several auxiliary lemmas. We note that throughout this
section
x =
1 + t2
1− t2 , 0 < t < 1,
and Pd(z) is the Legendre polynomial of degree d which is defined through the following recurrent
relation
(2d+ 1)zPd(z) = (d+ 1)Pd+1(z) + dPd−1(z); P0(z) = 1, P1(z) = z. (31)
We refer to [DH16] for more information on the Legendre polynomial and its connections to
evolutionary game theory.
Lemma 6.2. It holds that
lim
d→∞
Pd(x)
Pd+1(x)
= x−
√
x2 − 1.
Note that x = 1+t
2
1−t2 , we can write the above limit as
lim
d→∞
Pd(x)
Pd+1(x)
=
1− t
1 + t
. (32)
Proof. According to [DH16, Lemma 4] we have
Pd(x)
2 ≤ Pd+1(x)Pd−1(x).
Since Pd(x) > 0, we get
x ≥ 1
x
=
P0(x)
P1(x)
≥ P1(x)
P2(x)
≥ . . . ≥ Pd−1(x)
Pd(x)
≥ Pd(x)
Pd+1(x)
≥ 0. (33)
Therefore, there exists a function 0 ≤ f(x) ≤ 1x such that
lim
d→∞
Pd(x)
Pd+1(x)
= f(x).
From the recursive relation (31) we have
(2d+ 1)x = (d+ 1)
Pd+1(x)
Pd(x)
+ d
Pd−1(x)
Pd(x)
,
which implies that
d+ 1
d
=
Pd−1(x)
Pd(x)
− x
x− Pd+1(x)Pd(x)
.
Taking the limit d→∞ both sides we obtain
1 =
f(x)− x
x− 1f(x)
.
Solving this equation for f(x), requiring that 0 ≤ f(x) ≤ 1x ≤ x we obtain f(x) = x−
√
x2 − 1.
Lemma 6.3. The following inequalities hold
(1− t)2 ≤ (1− t2) Pd(x)
Pd+1(x)
≤ 1 + t2. (34)
Proof. By dividing by 1− t2, the required inequalities are equivalent to (recalling that 0 < t < 1)
1− t
1 + t
≤ Pd(x)
Pd+1(x)
≤ x,
which are true following from (32) and (33).
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Lemma 6.4. The following equality holds
2(d− 1)t [B1(1 + t)−M1(d− 1)] = (t− 1)
[
A1(1 + t)
2 −M1(d− 1)2
]
. (35)
Proof. The stated equality is simplified to
A1(t
2 − 1) +M1(d− 1)2 − 2(d− 1)tB1 = 0. (36)
We use the following results from [DH16, Lemma 3 & Section 6.2]
A1(t, d) = (d− 1)2M1(t, d− 1) = (d− 1)2(1− t2)d−2Pd−2(x), M1 = (1− t2)d−1Pd−1(x), (37)
B1 =
M ′1
2
(38)
= M1
(−t (d− 1)
1− t2 +
2t
(1− t2)2
P ′d−1
Pd−1
(x)
)
= M1
(−t (d− 1)
1− t2 +
2t
(1− t2)2
(d− 1)(1− t2)2
4t2
(
1 + t2
1− t2 −
Pd−2(x)
Pd−1(x)
))
= M1
(−t (d− 1)
1− t2 +
d− 1
2t
(
1 + t2
1− t2 −
Pd−2(x)
Pd−1(x)
))
= (d− 1)
(
−t(1− t2)d−2Pd−1(x) + (1 + t
2)(1− t2)d−2Pd−1(x)− (1− t2)d−1Pd−2(x)
2t
)
.
Substituting these expressions into the left-hand side of (36) we obtain 0 as required.
Lemma 6.5. The following inequality holds
(t− 1) [B1(1 + t)−M1(d− 1)] ≥ 0, (39)
(t2 − 1)B1 − (d− 1)tM1 ≤ 0, (40)
(t2 − 1)(B2 −B1)− (d− 1)t(M2 −M1) ≤ 0. (41)
Proof. We prove (39) first. Since M1 > 0, (39) is simplified to
(t2 − 1)B1
M1
− (d− 1)(t− 1) ≥ 0.
Using the relation (38) between B1 and M1 we obtain
(t2 − 1)B1
M1
− (d− 1)(t− 1) = (t2 − 1) M
′
1
2M1
− (d− 1)(t− 1)
= (t2 − 1)
[
− t (d− 1)
1− t2 +
2t
(1− t2)2
P ′d−1
Pd−1
(
1 + t2
1− t2
)]
− (d− 1)(t− 1)
= (d− 1) + 2t
t2 − 1
P ′d−1
Pd−1
(x) .
Now using the following relation [DH16, Eq. (49)]
P ′d−1(x)
Pd−1(x)
=
d− 1
x2 − 1
(
x− Pd−2(x)
Pd−1(x)
)
=
(d− 1)(1− t2)2
4t2
(
1 + t2
1− t2 −
Pd−2(x)
Pd−1(x)
)
, (42)
we obtain
(t2 − 1)B1
M1
− (d− 1)(t− 1) = (d− 1)
(
1− 1 + t
2
2t
− t
2 − 1
2t
Pd−2(x)
Pd−1(x)
)
= −d− 1
2t
[
(1− t)2 − (1− t2)Pd−1
Pd−1
(x)
]
≥ 0,
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where the last inequality follows from Lemma 6.3. This establishes (39).
Next we prove (40), which can be simplified to
(d− 1)
(
−1 + t
2
2t
− t
2 − 1
2t
Pd−2(x)
Pd−1(x)
)
≤ 0,
which is in turn equivalent to
(1− t2)Pd−2(x)
Pd−1(x)
≤ 1 + t2.
This has been proved in Lemma 6.3.
Finally we prove (41). First we simplify
(t2 − 1)B2 − (d− 1)tM2 = (d− 1)(t2 − 1)(1 + t)2d−3 − (d− 1)t(1 + t)2d−2 = −(d− 1)(1 + t)2d−2.
Thus (41) is equivalent to
(d− 1)
(
1 + t2
2t
+
t2 − 1
2t
Pd−2(x)
Pd−1(x)
− (1 + t)2d−2
)
≤ 0.
This clearly holds because t ≥ 0 and from the proof of the first inequality we already know that
1 + t2
2t
+
t2 − 1
2t
Pd−2(x)
Pd−1(x)
− 1 ≤ 0.
Thus we finish the proof of the lemma.
We are now ready to provide a proof of Proposition 6.1.
Proof of Proposition 6.1 . From Lemma 6.4, since M1, A1, B1 are polynomials (of t) with integer
coefficients, there exists a polynomial S(t) such that
B1(1 + t)−M1(d− 1) = (t− 1)S(t) and A1(1 + t)2 −M1(d− 1)2 = 2(d− 1)t S(t)
If follows from (39) that S(t) ≥ 0. Next we will prove that
2(t+ 1)B1 [B1(1 + t)−M1(d− 1)] ≤M1
[
A1(1 + t)
2 −M1(d− 1)2
]
, (43)
2(t+ 1)(B2 −B1) [B1(1 + t)−M1(d− 1)] ≤ (M2 −M1)
[
A1(1 + t)
2 −M1(d− 1)2
]
. (44)
Indeed, these inequalities can be rewritten as
2S(t)
[
(t2 − 1)b1 − (d− 1)tm1
]
< 0,
2S(t)
[
(t2 − 1)(b2 − b1)− (d− 1)t(m2 −m1)
]
< 0,
which hold due to Lemma 6.5. Multiplying (44) with r > 0 and adding with (43) yields the
assertion of Proposition 6.1.
6.6 Comparison with known results for other classes of random poly-
nomials
The distribution and expected number of real zeros of a random polynomial has been a
topic of intensive research dating back to 1932 with Block and Po´lya [BP32], see for instance the
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monograph [BRS86] for a nice exposition and [TV15, NNV16] for recent results and discussions.
The most general form of a random polynomial is given by
Pd(z) =
d∑
i=0
ci ξi z
i, (45)
where ci are deterministic coefficients which may depend on both d and i and ξi are random
variables. The most three well-known classes of polynomials are
(i) Kac polynomials: ci := 1,
(ii) Weyl (or flat) polynomials: ci :=
1
i! ,
(iii) Elliptic (or binomial) polynomials: ci :=
√(
d
i
)
.
The expected number of real zeros of these polynomials when {ξi} are i.i.d standard normal
variables are, respectively, EK ∼ 2pi log d, EW ∼ 2pi
√
d and EE =
√
d, see e.g., [TV15] and references
therein. Random polynomials in which ξi are correlated random variables have also attracted
considerable attention, see e.g., [Sam76, Sam77, Sam78, Sam79, BRS86, FN05, FN10, FN11] and
references therein. Particularly, when {ξi} satisfy the same assumption as in this paper, it has
been shown, in [Sam76] for the Kac polynomial that EK ∼ 2pi
√
1− r2 log d, and in [FN11] for
elliptic polynomials that EE ∼
√
d
2 .
The random polynomial P arising from evolutionary game theory in this paper, see Equation
(1), corresponds to ci =
(
d− 1
i
)
; thus it differs from all the above three classes. In Section 6.7
below we show that a root of P is also a root of the Bernstein polynomial. Therefore we also
obtain an asymptotic formula for the expected number of real zeros of the random Bernstein poly-
nomial. We anticipate that evolutionary game theory and random polynomial theory have deeply
undiscovered connections in different scenarios. We shall continue this development in [DTH17b].
6.7 On the expected number of real zeros of a random Bernstein poly-
nomial of degree d
Similarly as in [DH16, Corollary 2], as a by-product of Theorem 4.1, we obtain an asymptotic
formula for the expected number of real zeros, EB, of a random Bernstein polynomial of degree d
B(x) =
d∑
k=0
βk
(
d
k
)
xk (1− x)d−k,
where βk are i.i.d. standard normal distributions. Indeed, by changing of variables y =
x
1−x as in
Section 2, zeros of B(x) are the same as those of the following random polynomial
B˜(y) =
d∑
k=0
βk
(
d
k
)
yk.
As a consequence of Theorem 4.1, the expected number of real zeros, EB, of a random Bernstein
polynomial of degree d is given by
EB = 2E(0, d+ 1) ∼
√
2d+ 1. (46)
This proves Conjecture 4.7 in [EGT10]. Connections between EGT and Bernstein polynomials
have also been discussed in [PLN14].
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